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THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA*

Until about five years ago, the courts had essentially exclusive, rather sleepy
dominion over the "property rights" issue. Today, legislation addressing the issue has
been debated repeatedly in Congress and in almost every state legislature. Several
state ballot contests have been fought over property rights. And property rights have
become a familiar topic of public debate, on television talk shows, on the op-ed
pages of the nation's newspapers, and even in the vice-presidential debate during the
1996 national elections.
The property rights argument in the political arena is straight-forward and
proponents repeat it with an impressive frequency and consistency. We support, they
say, the goals of environmental laws and programs. However, when the public
pursues these goals the public that benefits should, as a matter of fairness, pay
financial "compensation" to property owners who see any resulting reduction in the
value of their property. If the public cannot achieve its regulatory objectives without
affecting property values, or cannot afford compensation for the adverse effects on
property values, the public cannot fairly enforce the regulation. While few contend
that this absolutist position is consistent with the Supreme Court's traditional
interpretation of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment,' many argue that it is
consistent with the original, or at any rate the best understanding of the constitutional
command "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. '
The impact of the property rights argument on the tone and content of environmental policy discussions could hardly be overstated. Whereas debates over environmental policy in years past have focused largely on the question of the relative
importance of environmental policy goals, the property rights argument introduced
a new focus on the fairness of the means used to achieve these goals. The property
rights position also represents a new normative argument against the assertion of

* Director, Environmental Policy Project and Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. J.D., 1981, Yale Law School; M.F.S., 1981, Yale School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies; B.A., 1976, Yale College. An earlier version of this article was presented at the
June 1997 Association of American Law Schools Conference on Property.
I. Under Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), a regulation that denies

the owner all economic use of the property is presumptively a taking, subject to several broad exceptions.
See id. at 1014-19. Whether and under what circumstances regulations which have less severe economic
impacts may also result in a taking is a matter of extensive debate. CompareZealy v. City of Waukesha,
548 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Vis. 1996), with Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1994). See generally Richard Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1411 (1993) (arguing that Lucas decision reflects emergence of a two-tier taking test similar to
longstanding two-tier due process and equal protection tests).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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regulatory power to protect the environment: the preservation of individual dignity
and autonomy depends upon reining in regulations that protect the environment.
From one perspective, it appears that the property rights storm in the political
arena may have begun to blow itself out. The property rights, or taking, agenda is
commonly viewed as one of the singular excesses unleashed by the Contract with
America in the 104th Congress. There is less enthusiasm for pursuing taking
legislation in the 105th Congress than there was in the last Congress. In the states,
interest in property legislation has also waned.
At the same time, the property issue remains a major political obstacle to
implementation and development of environmental protection measures. The property
rights issue is a major impediment to the reauthorization of several major pieces of
legislation, including the Clean Water Ace and the Endangered Species Act. In part
because of the property issue, the Clinton Administration, a fierce foe of property
legislation proposed in the 104th Congress, has focused some its most high profile
environmental effort on initiatives that explicitly seek to satisfy both environmental
and private property interests. In short, the property issue appears to have significantly altered the environmental policy landscape for the foreseeable future.
This paper offers a critical analysis of property rights as a political issue. Part I
discusses the apparent causes and contradictions of the emergence of property rights
as a modem political phenomenon. Part II describes the recent political history of
the property rights issue. Part M discusses the substantive issues in this political
debate, and the natural as well as surprising political alliances which have formed on
both sides of the issue. Finally, part IV suggests some potential strategies to
reinvigorate and advance the cause of environmental protection in the present
political environment.
I. Property As a PoliticalIssue
The rise of the property issue reflects the erosion in all realms of the former
political consensus favoring an activist role for government. It manifests a loss of
faith in expansive Federal authority, which blossomed in the New Deal era, and the
revival of an earlier political philosophy supporting private property protection. The
prior constitutional touchstone for the property agenda was the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, upon which the Supreme Court relied to strike down wage
and hour laws and other types of intervention in the economy.5 In part to avoid the

3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
4. 116U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
5. See generally L/AURENcE H. TRIBE AMERICAN CONsTITtmONAL LAw 421-55 (1978) (discussing
close judicial scrutiny of legislative measures during the Lochner era). Of course, advocates of the
property agenda in the early part of this century were matched by vociferous opponents. In a 1910
speech, then-former Presidant Theodore Roosevelt declared:
Nothing is more true than that excess of every kind is followed by reaction; a fact
which should be pcndered by reformer and reactionary alike. We are face to face with
new conceptions of the relations of property to human welfare, chiefly because certain
advocates of the rights of property as against the rights of men have been pushing their
claims too far. The man who wrongly holds that every human right is secondary to his
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appearance of reviving an older, widely vilified social program, the property agenda
today has reemerged under the new banner of the Taking Clause rather than the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The rise of the property issue also reflects the powerful influence of libertarian
ideology on political and public discourse. Led by such politically active organizations as the Cato Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, libertarian
thinking has helped shape the national political debate, in environmental policy and
in other areas. In brief, libertarians reject any positive role for government except to
restrain the use of force against another citizen Reflecting the breadth of their
political ambition, advocates of a libertarian ideology point to the collapse of the
Soviet Union and most of the rest of the communist block as evidence of a historical
tide turning in their direction. As succinctly stated in a recent work by David Boaz
of the Cato Institute: "It's obvious now that total statism is a total disaster, leading
more and more people to wonder why a society would want to implement some
socialism if full socialism is so catastrophic."7
Finally, the rise of the property issue reflects the fact that we live in an era in
which property norms are changing at a relatively rapid rate. Under the weight of an
exploding population, evolving scientific knowledge, and changing social values, our
conceptions of appropriate uses of land and other natural resources have undergone
dramatic change. It is hardly surprising that the resulting dislocations and frustrations
have made this an era of property conflict.
While these broad social currents help explain the rise of the property issue, they
do not directly address the conundrum of why the property issue became the focus
of political, and specifically legislative debate. After all, the Taking Clause, like other
provisions of the Bill of Rights, was appended to the Constitution to provide a
judicial safeguard for minority interests. The Taking Clause was included in the Bill
of Rights, at least in part, because the majoritarian branches were regarded as
potential threats to certain property rights. Therefore, at least at first blush, it is
surprising that advocates of expanding property rights shifted their focus from the
courts to the legislative branch.
The shift to the political arena is even more striking in view of the obvious
willingness of the Rehnquist Court to reengage on the property issue. Prior to the
mid-1980s, the Court had let decades pass virtually without a hint of any interest in
expanding the contours of the regulatory taking doctrine. Since then, the Court has
handed down about a dozen significant decisions interpreting the Taking Clause.'

profit must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who rightly maintains that
every man holds his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its
use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it.
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism (speech delivered at Osawatomie, Kan., Aug. 31, 1910),
reprintedin THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AMERICAN MIND (Mario DiNunzio ed., 1994).
6. See DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 64 (1997).
7. Id. at 7.
8. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 818-19 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nolan v. California
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Claimants have uniformly prevailed in the land use taking cases decided by the Court
over the last decade."
Ironically, property rights advocates shifted their focus from the courts to the
legislative branch in part because they concluded that the Rehnquist Court was
unlikely to make sufficiently rapid or dramatic changes in the Court's traditional,
limited reading of the Taking Clause. This reflects the fact that the Supreme Court
is, at least compared to the other branches of government, an inherently conservative
institution. In particular, property advocates appear to have read the Court's 1992
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," which by and large
reaffirmed long-standing taking law principles, as a demonstration of the limitations
of the litigation strategy.
While property advocates may represent a minority interest, they represent a
particularly cohesive and well-financed political interest group capable of exerting
significant political influence. Organizations such as the American Forest and Paper
Association, the National Realtors Association, and the National Association of
Homebuilders have invested great energy and resources in the property issue. More
specifically, heavy investment in political campaign financing by property groups
helps explain the political prominence of the property agenda. According to the
Center for Responsive Politics, environmental group political action committees
(PACs) contributed 3:45,088 to congressional candidates in 1995.2 By contrast,
PACs for interests that supported property legislation gave $1.4 million to members
of the U.S. Senate alone. 3 All of the top ten recipients were members of the
Republican party, the leadership of which championed property legislation in the
104th Congress. Eight of the ten top recipients of contributions from these PACs, all
of whom were up for reelection in 1996, were cosponsors of the principal Senate
4
taking bill.
The rise of the property issue in the political arena also can be explained in part
by the successful effort to create a mythology which distorts the true identity of the
potential winners and losers in the property debate. According to this mythology, the
overwhelming majoriy of those who would benefit from property legislation are
middle class individuals and families seeking to make modest uses of small parcels
of land. This mythology has been generated by numerous anecdotes designed to
illustrate how ordinary citizens sometimes suffer economic loss as a result of
regulatory programs. The goal of this effort has been to portray conflicts between
land owners and government as an ordinary feature of daily life in America and to
suggest that many, if not a majority, of citizens would benefit from the success of

Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
10. The most important of the land use cases recently decided by the Supreme Court include First
English EvangelicalLutheran Churchv. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), and Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 304 (1994).
11. 505 U.S. 1003 (IS92).
12. See Closeup: Property Rights, MONEY IN PoLrrTcs ALERT (Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Washington, D.C.), May 13, 1996, at 1.
13. See id.
14. Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995).
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the property agenda. In reality, this mythology has obscured the fact that major
resource industries and developers have the greatest direct interest in property
legislation because they stand to gain the greatest financial reward from its success.
Without disputing the reality of some hardship cases, it is telling that many of the
most common "horror stories" retailed in legislative debates over the property issue
cannot withstand detailed analysis. For example, the Wilderness Society, a major
national conservation group, conducted a systematic review of all of the anecdotes
5
related during the House debate on the Contract with America property provision.'
This analysis demonstrated that nearly all of the anecdotes grossly misstated the true
facts, and some appeared to be pure urban legends.
The anecdote war reached its apex during the 1996 vice presidential debate
between Vice President Al Gore and Jack Kemp. During the course of the debate,
Kemp was questioned about a prior statement referring to a "regulation reign of
terror." In response, Mr. Kemp recounted a lengthy, garbled anecdote concerning an
Oregon farmer who "voluntarily... declared a wetland" on his property, which
apparently resulted in the return of the bald eagle to the farmer's land, and an order
6
by a federal agency that the owner no longer use his road or mend his fences.' This
high profile anecdote sent government officials and others scurrying to discover the
source of this anecdote. As recounted in a flip column in the Washington Post about
two weeks later: "The regional fish and wildlife folks are looking hard, but nothing
so far. They want the Kemp folks to give them the name of the farmer. Otherwise,
the Democrats are inclined to write it off as just another bogus endangered species
horror story."' 7
The courts themselves have also played a role in the rise of property as a strictly
political issue. Of course, property as a political issue is, by definition, associated
with activity in Congress and the state legislatures. Yet, the courts, and the Supreme
Court in particular, have played a central role in shaping and encouraging the debate
over property rights in the political arena.
In part as a result of dramatic changes in its membership, the Supreme Court has
exhibited an increased interest in the property issue. The Supreme Court now
regularly issues decisions on the property issue, which has helped foster public
interest in the issue. 8 The increased activity on the taking issue at the Supreme
Court level has been matched by the filing of increasing numbers of taking suits in
lower federal and state courts. 9 Most importantly perhaps, the Supreme Court's
15. See THE WILDERNESS Soc'Y, THE "TAKINGS" DEBATE IN THE HousE, MARCH 1-3, 1995: THE

ANECDOTES AND THE OFFICIAL RECORDS (1995) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
16. Federal News Serv., Campaign '96: Transcriptof the Vice-PresidentialDebate, WASH. POST,
Oct. 10, 1996, at A25.
17. Al Kamen, Next Time, Perhaps, a ShorterSpeech, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at A-21.
18. See cases cited supra notes 9-10. However, a statement by United States Court of Federal
Claims Chief Judge Loren Smith in Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994), probably represents
the most explicit effort by a member of the federal judiciary to promote property as a political issue. In
the opening paragraph of the decision, Judge Smith endorsed the concept of takings legislation by stating
that courts "cannot produce comprehensive solutions," and that constitutional protections for property
rights "should... be understood to be a social mechanism of last, not first resort." Id. at 39.
19. This conclusion is based on my own systematic monitoring of takings cases filed in federal and
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authority to pick and choose among the cases it reviews has allowed a majority of
the Court to select cases that, in practice, attract public attention and support for the
property agenda. In recent years, the Supreme Court has generally opted not to
accept cases brought by large economic actors to reexamine the contours of taking
doctrine, preferring instead cases brought by individuals and relatively small business
owners. The image of houses up and down the shore from David Lucas' vacant lots
in South Carolina, and the prospect of the Dolans' customers bicycling away from
their plumbing store in Oregon with bathtubs on their backs," have contributed
powerfully to public perceptions of the property issue. Some judges, it turns out, not
only read the newspapers, they also know what stories will sell newspapers!2
11. Recent PoliticalHistory of the Property Issue
A. National Politics
The emergence of property as a national political issue can be traced with fair
precision to the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in FirstEnglishEvangelicalLutheran
Churchv. County of Los Angeles," and the promulgation of Executive Order 12,630
the following year by President Ronald Reagan.' The issue decided in FirstEnglish
is whether it is sufficient, once a court finds that a regulation affects a taking, to
enjoin enforcement of the regulation, or whether a claimant is necessarily entitled to
monetary compensation. 4 The Court held that government must pay compensation
for a taking, at least for the period the offending regulation was in effect. This
conclusion reflected the Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment "not to limit
the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."'
At the same time, the Court emphasized that government can avoid future liability
for the taking by wiffdrawing the offending regulation.
The Reagan Executive Order was issued shortly after the First English decision,
ostensibly to safeguard the federal treasury from the financial peril created by the
Court's decision. After FirstEnglish, the authors of the Executive Order reasoned,
federal regulatory programs which overstepped the taking line would expose the

state courts over the last five years. See, e.g.,

NATIONAL AUDUBON SOC'Y, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL

(Summer 1997).
20. The first image is based on the widely publicized fact that David Lucas, the plaintiff in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), was seeking to build on beachfront lots on
either side of which development already had occurred. The second image is based on a widely repeated
quip by Justice Scalia during the oral argument in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 304 (1994).
21. The defeat of compensation-type takings legislation of the 104th Congress may signal a renewed
emphasis on pursuing the property agenda through the courts. New legislative proposals to make it easier
for takings claimants to brng successful takings actions in federal court certainly would help advance
such a strategy. See infra text accompanying note 60.
22. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
23. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
24. See FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 310.
25. Id. at 315.
26. See id. at 317.
AND LAND USE TAKING CASES
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federal government to potentially large, unavoidable financial loss.27 To minimize
this risk, the Executive Order directed all federal agencies to conduct ex ante taking
reviews of proposed regulatory actions to avoid unnecessary taking liability.'

While the fiscal rationale for the Executive Order is unobjectionable in theory, the
6

rder was nonetheless highly controversial. Critics objected that some language in
the Order, which purported to restate the constitutional standard for a taking, actually
put an important gloss on existing law, making it far more likely that an agency

would identify a potential taking using the Executive Order than by referring to
Supreme Court precedent.'

Critics also objected that the procedures called for in the Executive Order were so
cumbersome that the burden of complying with the Order would deter agencies from

taking necessary regulatory action. As professor Carol Rose has explained in
commenting on the Order's requirement that agencies attempt to answer detailed

questions about a proposed government action's effect on private property:'
A moment's reflection suggests how much these questions will resist an
ex ante investigation, and what special difficulties they present for

regulations with broad but mild impacts - the very regulations that are
often thought fairer than those that single out particular owners. In such

assessment requirements, the detailed factual inquiries of taking
jurisprudence simply are shifted without being avoided, and indeed, they
are shifted to a time frame in which they are less likely to yield reliable
answers. At best, such overblown procedural requirements are simply
wasteful and redundant, and at worst they are a kind of harassment of
regulators. 3'

27. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, § 1,3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprintedas amended at 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994).
28. See id.
29. To support their argument, critics pointed to CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE
REAGAN REVOLUTION - A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991), Fried's memoirs of his experience in the

Reagan Justice Department. Fried stated:
Attorney General Meese and his young advisors - many drawn from the ranks of the
then fledgling Federalist Societies and often devotees of the extreme libertarian views of
Chicago law professor Richard Epstein - had a specific, aggressive, and it seemed to me,
quite radical project in mind: to use the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a
severe brake upon federal and state regulation of business and property. The grand plan
was to make government pay compensation as for a taking of property every time its
regulations impinged too severely on a property right - limiting the possible uses for a
parcel of land or restricting or tying up business in regulatory red tape. If the government
labored under so severe an obligation, there would be, to say the least, much less
regulation.
Id.
30. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, § 5(b), 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprintedas amended at 5 U.S.C. §

601 (1994).
31. Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson Private Property,Public Rights, and The New Takings
Legislation, 53 VASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 288 (1996).
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The property rights agenda first appeared in Congress as an effort to pass
legislation to enforce the Reagan Executive Order. In 1990, Sen. Steven Symms (R.Idaho), offered language to enforce the Reagan Executive Order as a floor
amendment to the farm bill?' The proposed amendment was tabled by a vote of 5243?3
The following year, at the start of the 102nd Congress, Senator Symms introduced
a free standing bill to enforce the Executive Order, the "Private Property Rights Act
of 19 9 1. ' The Senate added the bill as an amendment to federal transportation
legislation, but the takdng language was removed from the bill in conference with the
House of Representatives." The year 1991 also marked the introduction of the first
federal taking bills which explicitly provided for federal financial payments over and
above the constitutional ' Just compensation" standard. Rep. Jimmy Hayes (D.-La.)
introduced a bill proposing an elaborate classification scheme for the nation's
wetlands based on the relative ecological worth of different wetlands. The bill
maintained existing regulatory standards protecting high value wetlands, but granted
owners of land subject to this classification the option to demand financial
"compensation" from the Federal government in exchange for complying with the
standards.' In addition, Rep. Bill Dannemeyer (R.-Cal.) introduced a bill offering
Federal financial payments to any firm or person who incurred "economic loss" as
a result of government action under the Endangered Species Act.37 Neither the
Hayes Bill nor the Dannemeyer Bill reached the floor of the House of Representatives for a vote in the 102nd Congress.
The property right3 issue escalated in the 103rd Congress with the introduction of
almost two dozen bills with property provisions, the first congressional committee
hearing devoted to a property rights bill, and heated congressional debate over the
property issue during consideration of legislation to establish a National Biological
Survey and legislation to elevate the Environmental Protection Agency to cabinet
status.3" The proposals in the 103rd Congress ranged from bills to enforce the
Executive Order, to bills to limit federal agency access to private lands, to various
proposals to alter the constitutional just compensation standard.39
In the Senate, the property agenda reached its high point in May 1994, when the
Senate, by voice vote, added a taking impact assessment provision, roughly modeled
on the Executive Order, to a bill to reauthorize the Safe Drinking Water Act.' This

32. See 136 CONG. REc. S10917 (July 27, 1990).
33. See id.
34. S. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess (1991). This and the other taking bills introduced in the 102nd
Congress are described in detail in Robert Meltz, Private Property ProtectionLegislationin the 102nd
Congress, CRS Issue Brief, Sept. 18, 1992.
35. See Meltz, supra note 34, at 10.
36. See H.R. 1330, 102d Cong. (1991).
37. See H.R. 4058, 102d Cong. (1991).
38. For a comprehensive description of the takings issue in the 103rd Congress, see Robert Meltz,
PropertyRights Legislation in the 103rd Congress,CRS Report for Congress, July 22, 1994, at 1, 2, 3.
39. See id.
40. See 140 CONG. REC. S5989 (May 19, 1994).
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proposal died in the 103rd Congress when the House of Representatives failed to take
up the drinking water bill. In the House of Representatives, Rep. Billy Tauzin (D.La.) emerged as a prominent and articulate leader of the effort to expand property
rights with the introduction of the "Private Property Owners Bill of Rights."4' This
bill provided for financial payments to landowners whenever application of the
Endangered Species Act or the Clean Water Act wetlands provision resulted in a
reduction of "50 percent or more of the fair market value, or the economically viable
use, of the affected portion of the property."42 Given this proposal's evisceration of
the Supreme Court's traditional approach of evaluating an alleged taking in relation
to the parcel as a whole, not simply the portion of the property affected by the
regulation, this bill would have mandated financial payments for essentially any type
of regulatory action under each of these two laws.
Also, the 103rd Congress saw the first recent adoption of a form of property rights
legislation at the federal level. The California Desert Protection Act,4 3 one of the
few major environmental accomplishments of the rancorous 103rd Congress, included
a provision instructing federal land managers, in the course of acquiring new lands
under the Act, to establish appraisal values without regard to the potential impact on
property values of Endangered Species Act requirements."
The property agenda reached its climax in the 104th Congress with inclusion of
a sweeping taking "compensation" provision in the new House Republican majority's
"Contract with America." The original version of this proposal mandated financial
compensation for any reduction in value of ten percent or more as a result of any
federal regulatory program.4 The bill provided several exceptions, including
limitations on actions that would violate local zoning ordinances or state nuisance
laws, limitations imposed pursuant to the federal navigational servitude, or any
restriction imposed pursuant to a determination by the President that the regulated
activity "poses or would pose a serious and imminent threat to . . . health and
safety." The actual significance of this sweeping proposal was only dimly
understood by the public and many members of Congress in the midst of the 100-day
rush to complete the Contract with America. In substance, it represented wholesale
reinvention of the Taking Clause based on a libertarian vision.
The debate on the House floor over the Contract with America was appropriately
revolutionary in spirit. During the course of the debate, proponents of the legislation
decried "overzealous Government agents," 7 "this rampant taking picnic on which
the agencies have embarked,"' "[g]overnment bureaucrats, acting without accoun-

41. See H.R. 3875, 103d Cong. (1994).
42. Id.
43. California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 410aaa to 4410aaa-83 (1994)).
44. See id. § 710 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-80).
45. See H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 9002(a)-9002(a)(2)(B) (1995).
46. I. § 9002(a)(3)(B).
47. 141 CONG. REC. H2495 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Smith).
48. 141 CONG. REC. H2498 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
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tability, mak[ing] decisions which, in effect, destroy households, farms, and
businesses,"49 and "government oppres[sion of] honest and hard working citizens."5
The bill ultimately adopted by the House of Representatives, House Bill 925, in

March 1995, required federal payments for reductions in property value under six
specified environmental and resource management statutes." Less than a month
after the House vote, a bill was introduced in the Senate which would have required
federal "compensation" payments for virtually all types of federal (and some state)
regulation.52 The bill was favorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee,53
but failed to reach the Senate floor.M The Clinton administration, shortly after the
House vote, announced a strong and unwavering intention to veto the legislation.
The 105th Congress has so far exhibited somewhat less enthusiasm for pursuing

the taking agenda than the last Congress. Sen. Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah), Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee, after months of apparent indecision, introduced a broad
compensation-type taking bill on May 22, 1997." Meanwhile, sponsors of the
leading initiatives in the Senate to reauthorize the Clean Water Act and the

Endangered Species Act have signaled that they do not intend to include specific
compensation-type provisions in their bills, suggesting that Senator Hatch's
decision to introduce his bill was a largely symbolic action. Traditional assessmenttype bills have also been introduced in the Senate" and the House." Rep. Lamar
Smith (R.-Tex.) has introduced a bill in the House to expand the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims." And in late fall 1997, the House passed (248-178)
a bill to expedite the prosecution of taking claims against local governments in
federal court, but the bill faces uncertain prospects in the Senate.0
49. 141 CONG. REC. H2510 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hayworth).
50. 141 CONG. REC. H2523 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Calvert).
51. See 141 CONG. REC. H2629-30 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995).
52. See S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995).
53. See S. REP. NO. 104-239 (1996).
54. On July 16, 1996, Senator Hatch introduced a revised version of S. 605 in an effort to revive
the flagging effort to get taking legislation to the Senate floor. See S. 1954, 104th Cong. (1996). The
revised bill narrowed the scope of the Senate bill to real property, raised the percentage threshold to 50%,
and provided an explicit exclusion for actions mandated by any Federal law prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of race, coler, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability. See id. The Senate leadership
never brought this bill before the Senate for a vote, apparently because they also lacked sufficient support
to pass this bill.
55. See S.781, 105th Cong. (1997).
56. In addition, major industry lobby groups have signaled their willingness to abandon
compensation-type takirg proposals. See Outlook Uncertain for Property Rights Bill This Congress,
NAr'L J.'S CONGRESS DAILY, May 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngdly File (quoting
Henson Moore of the American Forest and Paper Association as saying, "We still believe in it. We just
don't think it is going anywhere.").
57. See S. 709, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Sen. Hegel, R.-Neb.).
58. See Private Property Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 95, 105th Cong. (introduced by Rep.
Solomon, R.-N.Y.).
59. See Tucker Act Shuffle Relief Act of 1997, H.R. 992, 105th Cong. § 2 (introduced by Rep.
Smith, R.-Tex.).
60. See Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997, H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. (introduced
by Rep. Gallegly, R.-Cal.).
61. The primary Senate counterpart to the Gallegly Bill is the Citizen's Access to Justice Act of
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At the same time, the property issue continues to pervade environmental policy
discussions today. The theme that the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act
wetlands provisions, in particular, unreasonably burden private property owners is
helping to drive several proposals in Congress to substantially weaken these
programs. The prospect of opposition based on property rights concerns also has
stifled the introduction of new legislative proposals to address emerging environmental issues.' On the administrative front, some of the Clinton Administration's
most recent environmental initiatives have been consciously designed to address
important environmental problems while simultaneously mollifying property interests.
These include the agreement struck in 1995 to block the controversial New World
Mine north of Yellowstone by paying the mine promoters some $65 million.'
Another example is the proposal to buy out the owners of the Elwha Dam on the
Olympic peninsula in Washington State for several tens of millions of dollars to help
restore depleted salmon runs in the Pacific Northwest.'
B. The States
In the wake of the introduction of property bills in Congress, property advocates
also have pursued the property agenda in the state legislatures. Early state property
bills generally called for some type of taking impact assessment procedure modeled
on the Executive Order. Later, following the introduction of payment-type bills in
Congress, state legislators introduced this version of property legislation as well.
Today, property bills have been introduced in virtually every state legislature, and
over 20 states have adopted some form of taking law.' Most of the enacted
measures are assessment-type laws. Some establish a relatively innocuous
requirement that the Attorney General prepare periodic summaries of taking law to
increase agency expertise and sensitivity to potential taking issues. Four states,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, have adopted laws which explicitly depart
in some respect from the constitutional standard.'
Of perhaps greater long-term significance to the political debate over property than
state legislative activity has been the defeat of taking bills at the polls in two States,
Arizona and Washington. In Arizona, following the enactment of an assessment-type
taking law, a coalition of groups succeeded in placing repeal of the law on the state

1997, S. 1256, 105th Cong.
62. Among the most frequently discussed environmental issues today are land use management and
the challenge of controlling "sprawl" development. Nonetheless, there is little visible interest in the 105th
Congress in addressing this issue through legislation. Fear of the property issue explains, at least in part,
legislators' reluctance to address this issue.
63. See BNA'S DAILY ENv'r, May 21, 1997, at A-14. For a critical assessment of the administration's proposal, see Alexander Cockbum, Ladies and Gentleman. I Give You the President,
NATION, Sept. 16, 1996, at 9-10.
64. See U.S. DEP~t OF INTERIOR, THE INTERIOR BUDGET IN BRIEF DH-21, D-3 (Feb. 1997).
65. See NATIONAL AUDUBON SOcIETY, STATE TAKINGS LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY FOR 1996 SESSION

(Fall 1996).
66. See FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3601-02, 3:3608-12, 3:3621-24
(West Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to 49-33-17 (1994); TEx. Gov'r CODE ANN. §§
2007.021 - 2007.026 (1995).
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ballot in November 1994. By a vote of sixty percent to forty percent, Arizona voters
rescinded the taking law.67 Similarly, in November 1995, Washington State voters
rejected that state's payment-type taking bill, again by a sixty percent to forty percent
margin.'
In 1997, state legislative interest in the property issue persists, but apparently at
a lower boil. Property bills have been rejected at the committee level in a number
of states, including New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wyoming. A payment-type
taking bill was defeated in the Montana Senate following House approval. Property
bills apparently remain under active consideration in at least Idaho, Ohio, and South
Carolina.
Il1. The PoliticalDebate Unfolded
A. The Issues
The inherently charged nature of legislative debate has significantly shaped the
content of the discussion of property issues in the political arena. Inevitably, the
debate has sometimes been waged with slogans, epithets and sound bites. Just as
proponents of property legislation offered alarming anecdotes to support their
position, opponents of the legislation trotted out their own anecdotes to illustrate the
consequences of inadequate environmental standards or lax enforcement. Both sides
of the debate pitched their arguments to appeal to perceived public opinions and
prejudices. Leading national experts on property law who became embroiled in the
debate discovered that subtle explanations of Supreme Court taking jurisprudence
often failed to help a harried Senator decide how he or she was actually going to
vote.
Proponents of broad compensation-type taking bills have offered three basic
arguments in favor of this legislation.' They argue, first, that the Supreme Court
has failed to develop clear standards for identifying a taking, and the legislative
branch should fill the breach. For example, just as Congress has passed civil rights
legislation to bolster the constitutional protections against discrimination, property
advocates argued, it is appropriate for Congress to pass legislation supplementing the
Taking Clause. Second, proponents argued that property protection legislation was
necessary to counteract a recent, massive government intrusion on property rights.
At the federal level, this charge focused on the Endangered Species Act and the
wetlands provision of the Clean Water Act. Finally, at least some proponents of
property bills argued that the legislation was necessary to correct the Court's general

67. See Robert Meltz, "PropertyRights" Laws in the States, CRS Report for Congress, Dec. 2, 1996,
at 8 n.l.

68. See id. at 8 n.2.
69. These arguments are laid out in detail, for example, in the debate on the Contract with America
taking provision which spanned three days in March 1995. See 141 CONG. REc. H2459-639 (daily eds.
Mar. 1-3, 1995); see also Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: HearingsBefore the Senate
Comm. on Env't and Public Works, 104th Cong. (1995); The Right to Own Property: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss3/4

1997]

POLITICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

failure to respect the original, or at any rate, the most natural, reading of the Taking
Clause.
Opponents of taking legislation responded to these arguments and, more
importantly, sought to develop a vigorous challenge to the proposal as a whole.
Defensively, opponents argued that legislative supplementation of the Taking Clause
was unnecessary because the Court's traditional reading of the clause struck the
proper balance between private rights and the broader public interest. In addition,
they argued that the search for a simple mathematical formula to define a taking was
a doomed effort, because the answer to the taking question necessarily depends on
the thoughtful balancing of a variety of relevant factors. They also attacked the idea
of legislative supplementation as a ruse to disguise a misguided effort to radically
alter the constitutional definition of a taking. As to the issue of new government
intrusions, opponents argued that government regulation today is not fundamentally
different in kind from regulations imposed in this country for centuries. They also
argued that, to the extent recent legislative developments call for some corrective
action, it should be pursued directly by amending the laws being complained of,
rather than by undermining the laws indirectly through taking legislation. Finally, as
to the original meaning, opponents argued that the Supreme Court's current view of
regulatory taking already matched, if it did not exceed in scope, the meaning attached
to this clause by the drafters of the Bill of Rights.7
In a more proactive fashion, opponents of property rights legislation argued that
the legislation would impose an enormous new burden on the public fisc, resulting
in greater government deficits or higher taxes or both. The Clinton Administration,
for example, produced an estimate that the Contract with America taking provision
adopted by the House of Representatives would have cost taxpayers $28 billion over
the following seven years,' and concluded that the Senate bill would have cost
"several times" more.' Similar estimates of fiscal impacts were used to powerful
effect in state debates over property.
Proponents of property legislation, many of whom also support smaller, less costly
government, responded with vigor that this fiscal argument misrepresented the intent
and likely effect of property bills. They argued that the potential government liability
created by these bills would force government officials to change their regulatory
behavior to avoid burdening private property owners. This, in turn, would avoid the
need actually to make large compensation payments. The difficulty with this
response, of course, is that skilled lawyers would inevitably exploit a property law

70. For an exhaustive study of land use practices in colonial America, see John F. Hart, Colonial
Land Use Law and Its Significancesfor Modem Takings Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1252 (1996). The

author concludes that an examination of actual practice around the time of the drafting of the Bill of
Rights "destroys much of the basis for applying the Takings Clause to land use regulation at all." Id. at
1258.
71. See Private PropertyRights & EnvironmentalLaws: Hearingson S. 605 and H.R. 9 Before the

Senate ComnL on Env't & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 134-46 (1995) (testimony of Alice M. Rivlin,
Director, Office of Management and Budget).
72. See Letter from Alice Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 7, 1995) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
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to extract large payments from the government when that served their clients' purpose
better than regulatory relief. After all, manufacturers who advocate product liability
reform do not complain primarily, if at all, that existing law over deters shoddy
manufacturing; instead, they argue that existing law results in large, unjustified
windfalls. A compensation-type property law would inevitably produce unfair
windfalls at taxpayer expense, though in truth the total potential cost of such
legislation is virtua 1ly impossible to estimate.
Closely related to the fiscal argument was the argument that property bills would
generate a massive new wave of litigation and increased government bureaucracy.
Opponents of taking legislation, lawyers among them, rode public antipathy for
lawyers and litigation with the epithet that taking bills were- "A Lawyers' Full
Employment Act." This argument had undeniable force, despite proponents'
assertions that one of their primary objectives was efficient access to justice,
particularly for individuals of modest means. In general, property bills are
complicated pieces of legislation best suited for use by sophisticated legal counsel
representing well-heeled individuals and major firms. The argument that property
bills would create new, complicated, and time-consuming bureaucratic chores was
also a powerful strike against these proposals.
Opponents of property legislation argued that this ostensibly pro-property
legislation would actually harm the majority of landowners in the United States,
homeowners in particular. Upon reflection, it is obvious that so-called property
legislation actually seeks to advance the interests of only a subset of property
ownersthose who cut trees or mine ore, those who build shopping centers or
houses - in other words, those who seek to develop or otherwise work the land for
economic gain. These types of property owners have an obvious interest in property
legislation insofar as it would award them "compensation" for making less intensive
use of their land than they intended, or grant them the opportunity to exploit the land
for maximum financial return once regulatory restraints were lifted. Property owners
with already establihed uses, by contrast, stand in a very different position. Having
already developed their property, or having purchased developed property, these
owners' principal interest in land use regulation lies in the ability to forestall
neighboring development which would conflict with the use and value of their
property. The old saw in the real estate business is that the three primary determinants of real estate value are location, location, location; owners of property with
established uses naturally seek to use all available means to preserve the value of
their location. For these types of owners, regulatory restrictions on property use, far
from being a limitation on property values, are a critical tool in their preservation.
Importantly, but certainly not first, opponents of property bills argued that these
bills would undermine the enforcement of existing environmental standards, and
unreasonably deter the adoption of necessary new measures. The obvious effect of
property bills, especially in view of the limited federal budget, would be to make it
impossibly expensive to implement the law. The fact that many of these bills
specifically targeted environmental laws suggested, if it did not prove, that the major
impetus behind the property agenda was an effort to roll back existing environmental
laws through the back door.
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Equally instructive, perhaps, are the arguments which did not assume great
importance in the debate over property bills. For example, the extent to which
property legislation diverged from existing constitutional taking standards was not an
issue of paramount importance in the political debate. This seemingly crucial issue,
at least in the minds of lawyers, quickly became lost in impenetrable legal jargon.
Similarly, the massive wealth transfer proposed by property bills - whether
measured in monetary "compensation" payments, or rearranged property interests did not figure prominently in the debate. This may reflect a general distaste for the
rhetoric of class conflict in American politics. Finally, specific groups and legislators
focused on the moral and ethical dimensions of the property issue,' but these
themes did not figure prominently in the debate.
B. The Players
As the property rights debate has unfolded, virtually every significant interest in
American politics has been called upon to identify, if not actively promote, a
particular position on the issue. Because of the sweeping implications of property
legislation, all types of business, social welfare, and public interest organizations have
perceived a stake in the debate. For better or for worse, relatively few other issues
in American politics provide the same opportunity for political coalition building.
Just as the property issue has tended to generate somewhat unusual coalitions, it also
has disclosed some interesting fault lines between particular interest groups.
The proponents of property legislation fall into four basic groups. The first is the
numerous business trade associations, especially developer groups, who perceived a
distinct economic stake in the outcome of the debate. The second is the owners of
rural land, primarily forestry and agricultural interests, led most promiriently by the
American Farm Bureau. The third group is made up of ideological true believers
representing the libertarian wing of the non-profit community, including Defenders
of Property Rights, the Cato Institute, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
Fourth, a variety of wise-use and property rights organizations across the country
supported the legislation.
Opponents of the property legislation included virtually every conservation and
environmental organization; the historic preservation community led by the National
Trust for Historic Preservation; most major labor organizations, including the AFLCIO, United Steelworkers, and other unions; the League of Women Voters; the
National Catholic Conference and major Protestant denominations; and major
consumer groups.
Ultimately, the single most important opponent of property rights legislation was
the collection of national organizations which represent state and local governments,
including the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, and others. On some issues, state and local

73. The United States Catholic Conference is a notable example of a group which addressed moral
and ethical considerations. See Hearings on S. 605 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong.
(1995) (statement of Reverend John J. McRaith, Bishop of Owensboro, Kentucky, United States Catholic

Conference).
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government groups find themselves at odds with environmental organizations. For
example, these groups generally support more liberal delegation of federal
environmental programs to states and localities than environmental groups find
acceptable. State and local government groups were also among the most active
advocates of "unfunded mandate" legislation in the 104th Congress,74 which
environmental groups opposed. Because of both the direct and indirect financial
burdens property rights legislation would impose on them, and because of the
precedent federal property legislation would set for state legislatures, the state and
local government groups strongly opposed federal property legislation.
The academic community played a role in the political debate, primarily as
authoritative spokespeople for the point that the legislative proposal departed from
longstanding Supreme Court interpretation of the Taking Clause. This was the thrust,
for example, of a letter sent by 380 law professors to members of the U.S. Senate
commenting on Senate Bill 605." Several law professors also testified against
taking legislation before House and Senate committees.76 As indicated above,
however, it is far from clear that their purely legalistic arguments ultimately had
much impact on the political debate.
One of the more interesting fault lines in the taking debate relates to the cost issue.
In the 104th Congress, some of the leading champions of taking legislation
simultaneously championed a balanced budget, believing that both legislative
objectives would ultimately help reduce the size and reach of government. Other
fiscal conservatives opposed taking legislation as fiscally irresponsible. The conflict
is neatly summed up by the fact that the leadership of the Concord Coalition, the
leading advocacy group on behalf of a balanced federal budget, divided over the
property rights issue. Warren Rudman, a former Republican Senator from New
Hampshire and political ally of presidential candidate Robert Dole, stayed on the
sidelines of the debate. On the other hand, the late Paul Tsongas, a former
Democratic Senator from Massachusetts and a staunch environmentalist, became one
of the most prominent and effective opponents of taking legislation."
The position of the Christian right was both striking and politically potent. In
general, the Christian right is politically aligned with Republicans, the primary
champions of property legislation in the 104th Congress. However, the Christian
right's approach to various moral and ethical issues is obviously in tension with the

74. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1504 (Supp. I 1995)).
75. Law Professors Opposed to S.605 (May 2,1996) (letter signed by 380 law professors) (on file
with the Oklahoma Law Review).
76. See Private PropertyRights and Environmental Laws: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
the Env't and Public Works, 104th Cong. (1995) (statements of Richard J.Lazarus and Frank L.
Michelman); Right to Own Property: Hearingson S.605 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 86-101 (1995) (statement of Carol M. Rose); Protecting Private Property Rights from
Regulatory Takings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21-54 (1995) (statement of J. Peter Byme).
77. See Private PropertyRights and Environmental Laws, Hearings on 605 Before the Senate
Conm. on the Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 146-51 (1995) (statement of Paul E. Tsongas).
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libertarian wing of the Republican Party. Donald Wildmon of the American Family
Association became one of the most vocal and effective opponents of property
legislation in his home state of Mississippi because he perceived property legislation
as a threat to local communities' efforts to control sex-related businesses."
IV. Responding to the "PropertyRights" Agenda
How should advocates of environmental protection effectively advance their cause
in the era of private property? For all their force, most of the arguments advanced
by the opponents of property legislation are defensive in nature. They primarily
describe the numerous unintended problems that property legislation would produce,
without squarely addressing the central fairness argument advanced by the
proponents: the public that benefits from measures that generate widespread public
benefits should be willing to compensate individuals who bear the economic burden
of providing these benefits. Sketched out below are four interrelated approaches for
reinvigorating the environmental policy agenda in the 1990s and confronting head on,
rather than talking around, the central moral and political arguments of property
proponents.
A. Reinventing a Private Law of Environmental Protection
To start, environmental advocates should recognize that traditional communitarian
arguments for environmental protection measures have little political impact in the
face of the property rights argument. In the past, environmental advocates have
generally pointed to the significant, broadly shared benefits of environmental
protections. The political case for clean water, for example, has been chiefly
expressed in terms of protecting public health and providing recreational benefits for
all Americans. In legal terms, advocates of environmental protection have been
content to rely on the broad authority granted by the police power, and the
traditionally limited constitutional constraints on the exercise of this power, to justify
environmental protection measures.
In elementary political terms, measures that provide significant, widespread
benefits might be expected to prevail in the political arena over minority interests
adversely affected by the pursuit of these benefits. Over time, therefore, the workings
of the political process might lead to a readjustment of property rights to maximize
total public welfare. This analysis fails to account, however, for the difficulty of
organizing the large, diffuse constituency for environmental protection, or the ability
of highly motivated and easily organized special interests to mobilize in opposition.
Equally important, it fails to take account of the ability of individuals burdened by
new measures to create a vivid moral and philosophical case against environmental
measures.
This suggests that advocates of environmental protection should focus attention on
policies which create or enforce individual rights to environmental protection.

78. See American Family Ass'n, Press Release, Jan. 13, 1994 (describing proposed taking legislation
as a "Porn Owners Relief Measure") (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
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Legitimate claims of individual right to the redress of environmental problems should
trump, or at least neutralize, property rights claims that challenge environmental
measures. Vivid examples of injury to individual property owners and other citizens
as a result of environmental problems should likewise help neutralize the argument
that enforcement of environmental measures imposes unreasonable burdens on
landowners restricted from harming their neighbors.
This approach seeks in part to revive a pre-regulatory approach to environmental
protection, as exemplified by traditional nuisance remedies. Without ignoring the
limitations of traditional nuisance law to address many contemporary environmental
problems,' this recommendation reflects the judgment that the political force of the
environmental agenda has been weakened to the extent that the design of typical
regulatory measures has submerged the central role of environmental law in
protecting private property, and other personal interests of individual citizens. Many
of the property measures considered in Congress included a proposed exception from
a general compensation requirement for limitations which would forestall common
law nuisances. Because the public would bear the burden of demonstrating that a
proposed limitation would prevent the occurrence of a nuisance according to the
sometimes antiquated common law principles of the particular state, this type of
exception wquld provide precious little environmental protection. Yet, by acknowledging the need for some type of exception for nuisance-like harms, the
proponents of propertj legislation have identified their opponents' strongest card. The
challenge is to begin to rebuild the case for environmental protection from this strong
foundation.
Two recent initiatives demonstrate the potential power of this approach. The first
is the Homeowners Protection and Empowerment Act, a bill introduced in the 104th
Congress by Sen. Ron Wyden (D.-Or.) and Sen. John Warner (R.-Va.). 0 The bill
would create a "homeowner right of access to information" about activities with the
potential to reduce th- value of citizens' homes." More specifically, the bill would
require every applicant to a Federal agency seeking permission "to conduct property
impacting activity" to provide individualized notice of the proposed activity to every
homeowner within one-quarter mile of the boundary of the site of the proposed
activity.' An application to conduct property impacting activity is defined in the bill
to mean a license, contract, or virtually any other type of authorization "to conduct
an activity that generates pollutants or produces other adverse impacts with the
potential to reduce the value of any private home. ' The notice would describe the
proposed activity, the potential impacts, and the available opportunities to comment
on the application. This notice process would apply, for example, to a permit for the

79. See Private PropertyRights & EnvironmentalLaws: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Env't
& Pub. Works, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Richard J. Lazarus).
80. See Homeowners Protection and Empowerment Act, S. 2070, 104th Cong. (1996) (introduced
Sept. 12, 1996).
81. Id. § 3.
82. Id. § 2.
83. Id. § 3.
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filling of wetlands that would cause downstream flooding, the siting of hazardous
waste facilities, or the issuance of industrial air emission permits.
The bill also would create a new right of action in federal court allowing any
homeowner, or group of homeowners, to sue the holder of a federal permit or other
authorization for compensation for lost property value. The bill establishes a right to
sue on a strict liability basis, requiring only that the plaintiff demonstrate that the
federally authorized activity caused a reduction in the value of one or more private
homes of $10,000 or more. A prevailing plaintiff could recover attorneys fees, but
the bill also would authorize a court to assess attorney fees against the plaintiff if the
suit were dismissed as "frivolous, dilatory, abusive, or brought to harass the
defendant or for any other improper purpose. '
The political appeal of this turnabout-is-fair-play strategy is obvious. Like the
compensation-type federal taking bills, homeowner protection legislation provides a
virtually absolute protection against federally authorized activities which reduce
private property values. Unlike traditional taking legislation, which seeks to protect
and advance the interests of owners of undeveloped property, homeowner legislation
seeks to protect owners of already constructed homes. Because there are over sixtyfive million homeowners in the United States, and the purchase of a home represents
most families' single largest financial investment, this proposed legislation has a
potentially large and highly motivated constituency. The fact that the bill was
introduced in the Senate by a liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican
confirms the broad political appeal of this type of measure.
A second example of the individualistic approach to environmental protection is
the "right to know" provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act enacted at the end of
the 104th Congress.' The Act requires owners and operators of public drinking
water systems to provide notice to each person served by the system of any failure
to comply with a maximum contaminant level or other standard, and of the grant of
a variance or exemption from the requirement to comply with a contaminant level.'
The Act contains elaborate provisions governing rulemaking regarding the form,
content, and frequency of the public notice, with more extensive notice requirements
mandated for violations with potentially serious adverse health effects.' In addition
to event-specific notices, the Act requires public drinking water systems, with certain
exceptions for smaller systems, to mail to each customer annually a report on the
level of contaminants in the water distributed by the system.'
This "right to know" provision reflects the philosophy that an educated consumer
will act more effectively to protect her interest, presumably by continuously agitating
for more healthful drinking water supplies. Like the homeowner protection proposal,
the "right to know" provision relies less on direct governmental action to protect the

84. Id. § 5.
85. See Safe Water Drinking Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-3c).
86. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997).

§ 300g-3(c)(2).
87. See id.
88. See id. § 300g-3(c)(4).
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environment, and seeks to empower the citizen to act individually to protect his or
her own self interest.
This general approach can, of course, be deployed in a variety of different forms.
The Sierra Club, for example, recently advanced the proposal that builders of homes
in flood-prone areas be responsible for compensating their customers for any flood
losses they subsequently incur." Other potential legislation might require developers
to inform home purchasers whether the site includes filled wetlands, helping alert
consumers to potential flooding or unstable building foundations; require sellers of
real estate to inform purchasers of past flooding events affecting the site; or require
a government agency to provide periodic reports to owners of homes and other
property in a particular watershed of the extent and pace of floodplain alteration or
wetland filling.
B. Reasserting Public Ownership Rights
Another potential Epproach to reinventing environmental policy in the property
rights era is to reaffirm and reassert common public ownership of certain environmental resources. Many environmental protection and management measures are
unavoidably communitarian in nature, and the political argument in support of these
measures must ultimately rest, if it rests anywhere, in a public right to these
protections. This approach represents a political analog to the public trust doctrine.
In the political context, the public trust argument does not, of course, offer any
particular rule of decision for resolving disputes over public trust resources. Rather,
it supplies a normative argument for why the public can legitimately adopt
regulations to protect certain resources in the first place.
In a 1986 article," Richard Lazarus advised environmentalists to eschew reliance
on the public trust doctrine to advance their cause. He stated that "[t]he public trust
doctrine simply has no place in the emerging scheme" of environmental regulation.'
"The doctrine finds its home in the legal analytic framework supported by traditional
property dogma currently (and appropriately) being abandoned. It was essentially the
public property analog to those private property concepts, which are now eroding."02
Ten years later, it is apparent that Lazarus' prediction about the erosion of traditional
property thinking was wide of the mark. However, Lazarus' insight into the analytic
consanguinity of public ownership thinking and private property rights retains force.
Just as it may well have been sound to advise abandonment of public ownership
thinking in light of the apparent erosion of traditional private property thinking, the
revival of private property thinking may call for a revival of the countervailing idea
of public ownership to explain and justify environmental protection measures.

89. See BREr HULSIY & BRETr KOELLER, SIERRA CLUB, FLAODS, DEATH, AND WETLANDS
DESTRUCTION FROM 1993 - MARCH 12, 1997: How WETLANDS DESTRUCTION MAY INCREASE FLOOD
DEATHS 7 (Mar. 1997).
90. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning thAPublic Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631 (1986).
91. Id. at 701.
92. Id.
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The most obvious opportunity to use public ownership thinking is to justify
protection of publicly owned federal and state lands. Jack Ward Thomas, former
chief of the U.S. Forest Service, illustrated the rhetorical force of this argument in
a recent speech concerning proposed delegation of responsibility for managing federal
public lands to the states:
Right up front, I clearly state, without equivocation that these are our
lands today - the lands of all the people. These are our lands - they
belong to us lock, stock and barrel. And they will be our lands and our
children's and our children's children's lands far into the future unless we,
allow
as a people, through carelessness or apathy or conscious choice,
93
that precious heritage to be sold or traded away for pottage.
Of course, as a legal matter, it is self-evident that the federal government, as
holder of the title to public lands, has very extensive legal authority over the uses of
public lands. And the idea of public rights in the public's land has certainly played
a part in public land conservation advocacy. Yet public ownership thinking has
nonetheless not played as prominent a role as it seemingly deserves, particularly in
light of the (somewhat nonsensical) strength of the property rights movement in the
public lands states in the western United States. For example, in terms of public
message, efforts to reform the 1872 Mining Acte and federal land grazing policies
have focused on the severity of the environmental problems associated with these
programs and the magnitude of the taxpayer-funded subsidies under these programs.
Reticence to rely heavily on the idea of public ownership rights may reflect an
understandable desire to avoid legitimating the resurgence of property thinking in
general. Yet it is worthwhile to consider the future potential of these reform efforts
if they were more firmly grounded in the idea of public rights in public lands.
The public ownership idea is also potentially useful to address the most politically
vulnerable federal conservation program, the Endangered Species Act and other
regulatory efforts to protect wildlife and their habitats. If protection of wildlife is
equated in the public mind with the protection of a public property resource, it is an
easy step to conclude that the public property right in wildlife should trump, or at
least match, conflicting private claims to use property in a way that conflicts with this
95
public property right. As a number of commentators, most notably Oliver Houck,
have discussed, there is venerable legal tradition which supports this political
argument.
Many state court decisions recognize that the states own their wildlife resources
and serve as trustees over wildlife for the benefit of all citizens. According to a
survey Houck conducted, at least thirty-one states explicitly claim ownership or title

93. Jack Ward Thomas, Devolution of the Public's Land-Trading a Birthright for Pottage, Address
(1997) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).

94. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-21a (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
95. See Oliver Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say About
Whether Restrictionson Private Propertyto Protect Them Constitute 'Takings?", 80 IOWA L. REv. 297,
308-21 (1995).

96. See id. at 309.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:351

of fish and wildlifd either by statute or in their constitutions.' In part because early
decisions firmly lodged ownership of wildlife at the state level, the support for
federal government (simultaneous?) ownership of wildlife resources is more
attenuated. However, numerous decisions, relying on a wide variety of federal
authorities, treat the federal government as standing in a tiustee relationship to
wildlife resources as well." The larger point is that American law has long
embraced the idea of public ownership of wildlife as a natural and logical necessity,
suggesting the potential common sense value of this argument in the political debate.
Nonetheless, wildlife conservation advocates, like advocates of environmentally
responsible public land management, have generally avoided framing their case in
terms of public prop- rty rights. Defenders of the Endangered Species Act, for
example, have argued that.protecting endangered wildlife is important in order to
preserve entire ecosystems of which the species are a part, to safeguard nature's
storehouse of medicines and other useful chemical compounds, and to recognize the
high value the public ostensibly places on the continued existence of individual
species." None of these arguments, however, directly meets the property rights
argument. Indeed, because these arguments underscore the diffusely shared benefits
of wildlife conservation, they appear to reinforce the property rights argument against
wildlife conservation laws. The public ownership idea, by contrast, justifies and
explains public wildlife conservation efforts.
C. Finding Out Who Owns What
Political discourse about property suffers from a poverty of information about who
actually owns what land in the United States - and consequently about the actual
identity of the winners and losers in the property debate."W The abstract character
of much academic discussion of property issues, the paucity of available data, as well
as the preoccupation of both sides of the debate with the telling anecdote, has served
to obscure larger issues of equity. A better public understanding of land distribution
patterns would improve public understanding of the issue, and would likely build
more effective political opposition to efforts to redefine property rights legislatively
to benefit the owners of undeveloped land.
The available evidence, most of which has been collected by specific industry
sectors, demonstrates that owners of undeveloped property who would potentially
benefit from property legislation are a small minority of all property owners. There
are approximately three million agricultural land owners and about eight million
owners of forestland"'0 By far the largest group of property owners is home97. See id. at 309-10, 310 n.76.
98. Seeid. at 311-13.
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and, working within the limitations of available data, have explained the relevance of this issue to the
property debate. See, e.g., Gene Wunderlich, Property In, Taxes On, Agricultural Land (1995) (unpublished Land Tenure Center Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with the Oklahoma Law
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owners - about sixty-five million."° In addition, there are about five million
owners of commercial and industrial land."0
The available evidence also reveals substantial concentration of land ownership."0
Only about 124,000 owners, representing about four percent of farmland owners, hold
forty-seven percent of all U.S. farmland. The concentration of agricultural land
ownership has rapidly increased since the mid-1930s. Concentration of forest land
ownership is even more extreme, with fewer than one percent of the forest land
owners, about 63,000 owners, owning forty-eight percent of the forest land in the
United States. The 2,000 largest ownerships (10,000 acres or more) represent less
than .03% of forest land ownerships, but they held eight-four million acres or twentyfive percent of all the forest land. 5
The implications of this data for the property debate are obvious. Owners of
undeveloped land would benefit from property legislation, and owners with the most
undeveloped land would benefit the most. By contrast, owners of developed property,
such as homeowners, would not benefit and might well see reductions in their
property values. Overall, a powerful few would benefit at the expense of the
majority.
While these data are instructive, the quality of general and site specific information
about land ownership is very poor. In a 1995 analysis, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Economic Research Service could arrive at an estimate of the total
number of landowners in the United States which was no more accurate than "greater
than 60 million, but less than 80 million."'"0 Information on the degree of concentration of ownership, or the identity of specific land owners, also tends to be poor
at the community and regional levels. Improved information would do much to
improve the quality of the property debate.
D. Rethinking Property
Finally, I suggest that it is necessary to consider a comprehensive reassessment of
the relationship among private real property ownership, individual liberty andautonomy, and environmental protection. The classic justification for private property
ownership is to secure sufficient certainty and predictability to support private
7
However, it is
investment and efficient operation of the free market system.
frankly difficult to square this explanation of the function of the Taking Clause with
'existing Supreme Court precedent or any other likely reading of the Taking Clause.
After all, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,"° Justice Scalia wrote that
"the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted from
time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise

Patrick Leahy (Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
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107. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 3, at 268.
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of its police powers."" Numerous Supreme Court decisions, the validity of which
is not in question, have upheld regulations which significantly affect property values
and undoubtedly disrupt, if not destroy, specific investment plans."" In short,
prevailing opinion suggests that private property is subject to a kind of communitarian servitude which is frankly inconsistent with the idea that the scope of real
property interests vis-h-vis the government is significantly defined by the needs of
a well-functioning marketplace.
This conclusion suggests the need for a more searching examination of how
conservationists, and perhaps Americans in general, should think about real property
in relation to the high value many of us place on maintaining significant autonomy
of action and freedom from arbitrary government action. I offer two preliminary, and
concluding, suggestions.
The first is the potential value of broadening the property debate beyond the
specific topic of real estate, or property as a whole, to include a much wider variety
of rights and interests. As demonstrated by the data on land ownership, whatever
function the rights of land ownership have had in defining the content of liberty, that
function is clearly decreasing in importance for most citizens. The rise of substantive
and procedural "new property" has not only built upon traditional property rights, it
has also partly supplanted traditional property rights. Furthermore, for many large
landowners, corporate landowners in particular, investment in land is only one of
numerous investments, each of which carries different risks. Just as the courts look
to the reasonable investment-backed expectations of owners of specific real property,
it may be appropriate to forthrightly recognize that different types of investments are
subject to differing expectations about the likelihood and reasonableness of
government action that affects the value of the investment. Furthermore, in our
increasingly service and information-based economy, what after all is the relative
importance of investment in real property, particularly undeveloped real property, to
the overall size and growth of the economy?
Second, it would te wise for environmental advocates to recognize that environmental interests are not significantly harmed, and may well be furthered, by
government adherence to the principle of equitable treatment and procedural

109. Id. at 1027.
110. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (rejecting taking challenge to
restriction to one building on five acres which allegedly reduced property value by 85%); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding town regulation that barred continued operation of
existing sand and gravel operation in order to protect public safety); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 389 (1926) (reje.'ting taking challenge to zoning restrictions which allegedly reduced the value
of property by 85%). See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
489 n.18 (1987) ("T]he Court has repeatedly upheld regulations that destroy or adversely affect real
property interests."). Furthermore, in Lucas, Justice Scalia stated that "in the case of personal property,
by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the owner] ought
to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless
(at least if the property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale)." Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1027-28. Given the importance of personal property in commercial dealings, this statement seems
to flatly contradict the idea that the Taking Clause's purpose or function is to protect the security of

investments.
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regularity. Many have commented on the interrelationship of the values protected by
the Equal Protection Clause and the Taking Clause."' While the pursuit of
environmental quality depends in part on conditioning or adjusting property interests
to address new environmental problems, environmental interests are served little if
at all by government action which unfairly or arbitrarily singles out one or a few
owners to address a problem created by many. In fact, the opposite is more likely
true. Also, to the extent procedural safeguards improve the technical accuracy of
regulatory decisions, environmental protection should improve as well. Perhaps most
importantly of all, a common commitment to freedom from arbitrary government
action, when it occurs, would help reinforce the point that while there is much that
divides us, there also is much that should bring together all those engaged in the
debate over property rights.

111. See, e.g., J. Peter Byme, Ten Argumenv for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine,
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 131 (1995).
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